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ANENCEPHALIC NEWBORNS AS ORGAN DONORS: AN
ASSESSMENT OF "DEATH" AND LEGISLATIVE POLICY
INTRODUCTION
The growing need and increasing shortage of transplant organs
for infants have raised the issue of whether parents should have
the right to donate organs of their anencephalic newborns before
physicians declare the child legally brain dead.' Anencephaly is a
congenital defect in which development of the brain is arrested,
resulting in the absence of either the cerebral hemispheres or the
entire brain itself.2 From a legal standpoint, an anomaly exists in
that the anencephalic newborn is not legally "brain dead" because,
in most cases, the residual lower brain stem still operates and
maintains the vital functions of respiration and heartbeat for hours
or even days after birth.3 The maintenance of these vital functions
is precarious,4 however, and, because of the absence of higher brain
coordination capability, the newborn periodically "forgets" to
breathe.' These interruptions in respiration recur with increasing
frequency and cause irreversible damage to organs by depriving
them of blood flow and oxygen.6 By the time the anencephalic
newborn is legally brain dead, the organs are no longer viable for
transplantation. 7
1. Clapp, Prolonging Life to Promote Life, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 18, 1988, at 14;
Manipulating Death, COMMONWEAL, Jan. 15, 1988, at 3; Rovner, Infants Without Brains,
Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 1988, (Health), at 16; see Colen, Coma, the sequel; keeping
anencephalic infants alive for organ donation, HEALTH, Mar. 1988, at 12; Gorman, A Bal-
ancing Act of Life and Death: New uses of fetuses and brain-absent babies trouble doctors,
T'mE, Feb. 1, 1988, at 49; Foreman, Use of newborns as organ donors debated, Boston
Globe, Aug. 10, 1989, at 1; Dunn, Infant Organ Donation Still a Medical, Moral Quandary,
L.A. Times, June 11, 1989, at 3, col. 4; see also Note, Death Unto Life: Anencephalic In-
fants as Organ Donors, 74 VA. L. REv. 1527 (1988).
2. R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS: MORAL DILEMMAS IN
MEDICINE 41 (1984).
3. Harrison, The Anencephalic Newborn as Organ Donor, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.
1986, at 21.
4. Id.
5. Rovner, supra note 1, at 16.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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In most cases, when physicians diagnose a fetus as anencephalic,
the parents decide to abort the pregnancy.' In some cases, how-
ever, the parents choose to have the child and volunteer the in-
fant's organs for transplantation to derive some good from a tragic
situation.' Because the use of anencephalic newborns as organ do-
nors before they are declared brain dead is illegal in the United
States, these newborns most often are allowed to die naturally,
with their organs becoming nonviable for transplant purposes.10
The loss of these organs has fueled a legal and ethical debate
regarding the policy issues behind both determination of death and
organ transplantation: Should the law declare these infants
equivalent to brain dead so that their organs may be taken while
the organs are still viable?" Are anencephalic newborns "persons"
with full rights under the law, including the right to bodily integ-
rity and the right to die naturally? Is it unethical not to use such
organs to save another life, a life that, unlike the anencephalic, has
true potential? If the law declares anencephalic newborns brain
dead, will this create a danger that society will slide down a slip-
pery slope toward the utilitarian use of one human being for the
benefit of another?
This Note examines the policy questions surrounding the use of
anencephalic newborns as organ donors before they are declared
legally brain dead. First, it defines and describes the medical con-
dition of anencephaly. Next, it surveys the legal status of
8. Shewmon, Capron, Peacock & Schulman, The Use of Anencephalic Infants as Organ
Sources, A Critique, 261 J. A.M.A. 1773, 1774 (1989) (Of the total detected anencephalic
fetuses, 95% are electively aborted.); see Foreman, supra note 1, at 1.
9. E.g., Shewmon, supra note 8, at 1774; Meyer, A Choice, Not a Dilemma, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 4, 1988, at 90; Dunn, supra note 1; Rovner, supra note 1, at 16.
10. Blakeslee, Law Thwarts Efforts to Donate Infant's Organs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1986,
§ C, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Blakeslee, Law Thwarts Efforts]; see Blakeslee, Infant Trans-
plant Program is Halted to Reassess Issues, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1988, § 1, at 7, col. 1
[hereinafter Blakeslee, Infant Transplant]. In August 1988, Loma Linda University Medical
Center suspended its program of placing anencephalic newborns on respirators for one week
to preserve organs for transplantation. Under the program, anencephalic newborns received
life support for seven days after birth. If the anencephalic newborn met brain death criteria
within that time period, its organs were taken; if it did not, life support was removed and
the newborn permitted to die naturally. Of eleven anencephalic newborns placed on life
support, only one met brain death criteria within the one-week time period, creating fears
that life support was actually strengthening brain stem function and prolonging life. Id.
11. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 21.
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anencephalic newborns by focusing on current federal and state
regulations regarding the definition of death, organ transplanta-
tion, and the privacy rights of parents and children. The Note then
summarizes the competing policy interests through a balancing of
interests analysis, and in conclusion suggests a legislative frame-
work that allows taking the anencephalic newborn's organs while
both safeguarding against possible slippery slope consequences and
maintaining the dignity of the anencephalic newborn.
MEDICAL BACKGROUND
The prevalence of anencephalic births has been declining stead-
ily over the past several decades. 2 A conservative estimate sug-
gests that in the late 1980s approximately 1,125 anencephalic in-
fants are born in the United States every year, averaging 0.3 per
1,000 births.13 Two-thirds of these anencephalic infants are still-
born. 4 Of the one-third born alive, studies show that only 40%
will survive longer than twenty-four hours, with 35% of these sur-
viving newborns expected to be alive on the third day and only 5%
alive on the seventh day.'5 These figures demonstrate that most
anencephalic newborns do not survive the first twenty-four hours
after birth, and of those that do, only a few survive a week's time.'6
The devastating nature of anencephaly guarantees a low survival
expectancy. Anencephaly is a congenital defect involving the cen-
tral nervous system in which the brain never completely devel-
ops.' 7 At a minimum, the cerebral hemispheres are missing and in
some cases the entire brain, including the brain stem, is absent. 8
12. Shewmon, supra note 8, at 1774.
13. Id. Other recent sources suggest that approximately 2,000-3,000 anencephalic infants
are born in the United States every year, averaging one out of every 1,000 births. See, e.g.,
Goldsmith, Anencephalic Organ Donor Program Suspended; Loma Linda Report Expected
to Detail Findings, 260 J. A.MA. 1671, 1672 (1988); Manipulating Death, supra note 1, at 3;
Capron, Anencephalic Donors: Separate the Dead from the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Feb. 1987, at 5.
14. Shewmon, et al., supra note 8, at 1174; Harrison, supra note 3, at 21.
15. Capron, supra note 13, at 6 (citing a study in Baird & Sadovnick, Survival in Infants
with Anencephaly, 23 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 268-72 (1984)).
16. Ninety-five percent of anencephalic newborns die within a week. Goldsmith, supra
note 13, at 1671; Steinfels, Ideas & Trends: Infant Organ Plan Ends; Brief Lives, Large
Questions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1988, at 8, col. 1.
17. R. WEIR, supra note 2, at 41.
18. Id.
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As the above figures suggest, the medical prognosis for
anencephalic newborns is certain death and the diagnosis is almost
never ambiguous. 9 The diagnosis is self-evident because the
anencephalic newborn has no skull above the forehead, no cerebral
hemispheres and no cerebral cortex; the brain, when it is present,
consists of a small portion of the brain stem resting on top of the
spine.2 0 The absence of an intact skull leaves the brain exposed to
infection, thus lowering significantly the newborn's potential for
survival.2 In addition to the threat of infection, an anencephalic
newborn's length of survival depends on the strength of its brain
stem's ability to function.22
Similar to a cable the size of the little finger, the brain stem con-
nects the upper brain to the spinal cord and serves as a communi-
cation center for the central nervous system.2 3 It controls the auto-
nomic functions of respiration and circulation. 4 All anencephalic
newborns begin to die as soon as they are born because the brain
stem intermittently fails to support the vital functions of respira-
tion and circulation, which in turn deprives vital organs of their
oxygenated blood supply.25 These intermittent interruptions recur
more and more frequently until the newborn dies.26 By the time of
19. See Arras & Shinnar, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: A Critique, 259 J.
A.M.A. 2284, 2284 (1988); Foreman, supra note 1, at 1; Blakeslee, Law Thwarts Efforts,
supra note 10, at 9, col. 3. But see Capron, supra note 13, at 6-7. Capron notes that al-
though neurologists usually diagnose anencephaly accurately, cases of long survival in which
an initial diagnosis of anencephaly was later discovered to be inaccurate do exist. One such
misdiagnosed newborn actually had hydranencephaly and another amniotic band syndrome;
both of these conditions mimic anencephaly. Id. Capron recognizes, however, that the dan-
ger of misdiagnosis itself does not pose a significant enough risk to eliminate anencephaly as
a possible category on which to base a declaration of death. Id.
20. Blakeslee, Law Thwarts Efforts, supra note 10, at 9, col. 3.
21. See Adelson, Anatomic Findings in Acute Head Injury, in THE HEAD: A LAW-
MEDICINE PROBLEM 47 (0. Schroeder ed. 1961); Browder, Fracture of the Skull, in INJURIES
OF THE BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD AND THEIR COVERINGS 45 (S. Brock ed. 1960).
22. Capron, supra note 13, at 7.
23. D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING § 2:2 n.5 (1981).
24. Id. § 2:2.
25. Blakeslee, Law Thwarts Efforts, supra note 10, at 9, col. 4.
26. Rovner, supra note 1, at 16.
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death, the discontinuous blood flow has irreversibly damaged the
newborn's organs, making them nonviable for transplant
purposes.27
CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF ANENCEPHALIC NEWBORNS
Definition of Death
Some state legislators have proposed- defining anencephalic
newborns as "dead" as a limited exception to the legal definition of
brain death.28 They reason that if anencephalic newborns are so
defined, no legal or ethical dilemma regarding removal of the
newborns' organs exists because, theoretically, the removal would
be the same as taking organs from a corpse. By extending this
analogy further, they could also argue that the anencephalic new-
born is nonviable like a corpse in that, in view of the certainty of
death, the newborn has no potential for life. Despite the uneasi-
ness of labeling a breathing newborn dead, one can see the evolu-
tion to this line of reasoning through the history of the definition
of "death."
Common law
Traditionally, courts defined death as the irreversible cessation
of all vital functions, specifically circulation and respiration.2 9 This
definition became known as the heart-lung definition of death.30
Courts viewed death as an instant in time and, in the interest of
continuity and simplicity, delineated death as the specific moment
when the heart stops and respiration ends.3 1 In contrast to the le-
gal perspective, the medical profession saw death as a continuing
process, with some authorities believing that different kinds of
27. Id.
28. Blakeslee, Law Thwarts Efforts, supra note 10, at 9, col. 5; see infra notes 70-72 and
accompanying text.
29. Friloux, Death, When Does It Occur?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 10, 12-13 (1975).
30. Id. The traditional legal definition of death on which courts relied until the 1960s was:
"The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the
circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent
thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc." D. MEYERs, supra note 23, § 3:1 (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 488 (4th ed. 1968)).
31. E.g., Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478, 482 (1950); see D.
MEERs, supra note 23, §§ 2:1, 3:2; Friloux, supra note 29, at 10-11.
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death occurred at different times.3 2 Medical standards for deter-
mining death varied within the different disciplines of the medical
profession."3 Even had the courts acknowledged death as a process,
they still would have needed to pinpoint a specific final instant for
legal purposes. The heart-lung definition came under scrutiny with
the advent of modern technology that altered the concept of
death.3 4 Legal death began to take on new dimensions as a result
of a clearer understanding of the process of death itself.
From a medical standpoint, man dies in stages.35 Death is a pro-
gression beginning with clinical death, when respiration and circu-
lation cease." Following almost immediately is brain death, when
brain sites successively cease to function. 7 Biological or bodily
death follows, when all components of the brain, including the
brain stem, are dead. 8 Finally, cellular death occurs when tissue
dies. 9 Cellular death takes place at different speeds in different
organs, and the period between biological and cellular death pro-
vides the time needed for a successful transplantation. 0
During the brain death period, the brain itself dies in stages with
the cerebral or higher function centers, including consciousness
and intelligent thought, dying first and the lower centers, including
the brain stem, which maintains respiration and circulation, dying
last.41 If the higher centers are damaged, consciousness is lost per-
manently; heartbeat and respiration functions, however, can con-
tinue independently for a short time, or indefinitely with artificial
32. Friloux, supra note 29, at 10-11.
33. Id. at 11. Common medical standards used to approximate the time of death include
the development and degree of the following: post mortem lividity, post mortem rigidity,
loss of body heat, lysis of rigidity, clouding of the cornea and use of enzyme essay. Id.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
35. Hirsh, Brain Death, 1975 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 377, 378.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 379.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Authorities have also characterized the process of dying as two phases. The first
phase, known as clinical death, involves the cessation of all the body's vital functions. The
second phase, or biological death, involves the loss of cellular functions. D. MEYERS, supra
note 23, § 2:1.
41. Hirsh, supra note 35, at 379.
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support.42 Resuscitation can be successful, with full recovery, after
clinical death and before brain death because the higher function
centers have not yet been damaged.43 During the dying sequence,
humans reach a point of irreversibility when medical technology
can do nothing to restore life, and physicians ordinarily diagnose
this point as death.4 At this point, the complete deterioration of
brain tissue no longer warrants applying extraordinary measures to
keep the body alive.45
The consequence of the common law heart-lung definition of
death was to minimize successful organ transplants because doc-
tors feared liability if they removed organs while a patient still had
the vital functions of heartbeat and respiration.4" If surgeons
waited until heartbeat and respiration ceased, organs began to de-
teriorate because they could withstand only a limited time period
without oxygen.47 The success of transplantation depended in part
on the speed with which transplant surgeons removed the organs
from the donor.48
Modern medical technology, however, allowed physicians to arti-
ficially sustain respiration and heartbeat indefinitely, even when
no possibility for restoring higher brain function or consciousness
existed.49 Heartbeat and respiration thus could no longer serve as
criteria for defining death; otherwise physicians could restore or re-
vive "life" by artificial means.50 Society required a new and more
modern definition of death.
42. Id. Cerebral tissue dies within four to six minutes of being deprived of oxygenated
blood, while brain stem tissue can survive significantly longer. D. MvExRs, supra note 23, §
2:2.
43. Hirsh, supra note 35, at 378-79.
44. Id. at 379.
45. Id. at 379-80. Complete irreversible cessation of the function of brain tissue, called
brain death, occurs within 10-20 minutes of deprivation of oxygen. D. MEYERS, supra note
23, § 2:2.
46. Annas, Defining Death: There Ought to be a Law, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1983,
at 20.
47. Hirsh, supra note 35, at 382. Generally, brain tissue is most sensitive to an interrup-
tion of oxygenated blood flow and will suffer irreversible damage within five minutes of
oxygen deprivation. The kidneys can function for up to an hour after clinical death, and the
cornea and skin can survive several hours. The heart and liver can last up to 30 minutes
after oxygen deprivation. D. 1EYERs, supra note 23, § 2:3.
48. Hirsh, supra note 35, at 382.
49. Friloux, supra note 29, at 16.
50. Hirsh, supra note 35, at 397.
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Modern view
The need for new and standard criteria for defining death grew
out of modern technology and the desire to preserve viable organs
for transplantation.51 By the late 1960s, medical tests showed that
a complete absence of brain functions could provide an accurate
way to establish the same physiological state of death for patients
sustained on life support systems as the absence of cardiopulmo-
nary activity in patients not on life support.52 The new concept
called "brain death" defined death as the total and irreversible ces-
sation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain
stem. 3 The phasic dying process of the brain, however, required
reliable and workable criteria to diagnose the total absence of
brain functions.54 Although no clear consensus exists as to what
criteria must be met, the "Harvard" criteria represent the most
widely accepted diagnostic requirements to confirm brain death.55
These criteria require a concurrence of four conditions: "(1) un-
receptivity and unresponsivity (to externally applied, intense stim-
uli); (2) no movement or breathing; (3) no reflexes; and (4) a flat or
isoelectric electroencephalogram [EEG]. ' 5  Most jurisdictions
adopting brain death statutes leave promulgation of diagnostic cri-
teria for determining brain death to the medical profession so that
it may adapt the criteria to the evolution of medical knowledge
and technology. 7
51. Id. at 381. The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, appointed to reex-
amine the definition of death, gave two reasons for proposing a new definition of death: (1)
improved means of resuscitation and support of irreversibly brain damaged individuals that
allow vital functions to continue at great emotional and psychological cost, and (2) the diffi-
culty of obtaining transplant organs under the traditional definition of death. See Annas,
supra note 46, at 20.
52. Capron, supra note 13, at 6.
53. Id.
54. D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 4:2.
55. Id. § 4:3. Harvard's Ad Hoc Committee on the Definition of Death issued its report
containing brain death criteria requirements in August 1968. Id. § 4:4. Because of the lack of
a clear medical consensus of what these diagnostic criteria should be, the existence of brain
death was, and continues to be, a question of fact based on medical testimony. Id. § 4:10.
56. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Explain the Defi-
nition of Brain Death, 205 J. A.M.A. 337-40 (1968); see D. MEYERs, supra note 23, § 4:4.
57. See D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 4:10.
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ANENCEPHALIC NEWBORNS AS ORGAN DONORS
In the 1970s, most states began recognizing statutorily both the
common law and brain death standards for determining death.5 s
This consensus demonstrated the need for uniform legislation, and
the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA)59 arose in 1980.
The UDDA states that "[a]n individual who has sustained either
(1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions,
or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, in-
cluding the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be
made in accordance with accepted medical standards."0 As of
1987, sixteen states legislatively adopted the statute and two states
judicially adopted it,"l twenty additional states adopted substan-
tially similar statutes, and high courts in four other states adopted
a neurological definition of death.2 Most of these brain death stat-
utes simply approve brain death as an acceptable definition of
death and leave determination of brain death to medically ap-
proved diagnostic procedures.6 3 Under common law, a person was
dead when physicians using accepted medical criteria declared him
dead, and the accepted medical practice for determining death was
absence of heartbeat and respiration. 4 Because today brain death
has become an alternative "accepted medical practice" for deter-
mining death and is one the courts have accepted, statutory au-
thority permitting the pronouncement of death when all brain
functions have totally ceased no longer exists.6 5 New York City
58. See Capron, supra note 13, at 6.
59. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 312 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
60. Id.
61. See Capron, supra note 13, at 6.
62. See id.
63. See D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 4:10. In re Jones (Mora), 107 Misc. 2d 290, 292, 433
N.Y.S.2d 984, 986 (1980), held that courts should limit involvement to a review of "the
procedures followed and a determination that the findings are consistent with the estab-
lished medical criteria .... So long as the profession acts within the guidelines of accept-
able medical standards, it will be meeting legal requirements. No additional procedures are
required, and court authorization is unnecessary."
64. Annas, supra note 46, at 20.
65. Id. at 21. Brain death criteria simply represent another medical means to ascertain
death in addition to the heart-lung definition. Without respiration or circulation the brain
will die. When the entire brain, including the brain stem, ceases all functions, the heart and
lungs will follow. The mechanical support that can be provided for these vital functions is
finite, and cardiovascular collapse will eventually occur, beginning the process of cellular
death. All three systems are dependent upon each other and are necessary for survival. D.
MEYERS, supra note 23, § 4:4.
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Health & Hospitals Corp. v. Sulsona66 reflects judicial acceptance
of this point of view.
In Sulsona, the hospital sought a declaratory judgment defining
the "time of death" for transplant purposes under the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act, which governs transplants but does not ex-
pressly define death." The court held that the Act implied a defi-
nition consistent with generally accepted medical standards that
includes brain death.68 The court found that the absence of a clear
definition of death had a chilling effect on transplants and that
legislative adoption of the Act demonstrated the state's affirmation
of its public policy of encouraging anatomical gifts. 9
Amending death statutes to define anencephalic newborns as
"dead"
In May of 1986, California State Senator Milton Marks intro-
duced a bill to amend the California brain death statute by adding
the statement "an individual born with the condition of
anencephaly is dead." 70 The bill caused confusion and consterna-
tion among the legislators and eventually failed to meet a legisla-
tive deadline;71 no one has successfully reintroduced a similar bill
to date.72 The concern centered predominantly around whether
such an amendment would create a slippery slope by opening up
an ever-increasing category of "dead. '7 3
Opponents to such an amendment claim that certainty of death
based on an absence of independent heartbeat and respiration
would be lost because anencephalic newborns can breathe on their
own; death would become defined instead by the outlook of sur-
vival.7 4 Opponents argue additionally that other neurological con-
ditions, also lethal but with longer survival periods, are concep-
66. 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1975).
67. Id. at 1003, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
68. Id. at 1007, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
69. Id. at 1006-07, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 690-91.
70. See Blakeslee, Law Thwarts Efforts, supra note 10, at 9, col. 4.
71. Id.
72. See Shewmon, supra note 8, at 1774. Various groups, including the California Medical
Association, the California Nurses Association and the United Network for Organ Sharing,
oppose the creation of special death standards for anencephalic newborns. Id.
73. Capron, supra note 13, at 8.
74. Id.
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tually indistinguishable from anencephaly.15 Hydranencephalic 76
and certain types of microcephalic" conditions result in even more
attractive newborn donors because these potential donors live
longer, and their organs are consequently more developed. 8 More
importantly, opponents argue, such an amendment would create a
"higher brain" standard for determining death by declaring that
once the higher functions of the brain are irreversibly lost, a per-
son is dead even if the lower functions of heartbeat and respiration
still exist.79 Such a standard would mean that a patient such as
Karen Ann Quinlan, who lost all higher brain functions and was
irreversibly comatose, would be "dead" even though she continued
breathing on her own without the aid of life support.8 For oppo-
nents to the amendment, then, the central question becomes
whether society is willing to support a law that defines
anencephalic newborns as "dead" for the sole purpose of retrieving
vital organs, when the organ removal will in turn cause "death" as
we now interpret the term.8
Proponents of the amendment claim alternatively that
anencephaly is the only exception legislatures and courts should
ever make to the brain death criteria."2 They claim that if one
views brain and spinal cord defects as being on a continuum of
seriousness, anencephaly is unique in that it is off the end of the
scale. 3 The anencephalic newborn has no brain and no possibility
of ever achieving higher brain functions because the infant does
75. Id. at 7.
76. Hydranencephaly is a congenital defect in which the brain develops but is destroyed
by disease or infection during pregnancy. Most hydranencephalic infants die shortly after
birth, but a few have survived for years. R. WEIR, supra note 2, at 41-42. Unlike
anencephalic newborns, the skulls of hydranencephalic infants are intact and not subject to
infection, so they tend to survive somewhat longer than anencephalic infants. Capron, supra
note 13, at 7.
77. Microcephaly covers a variety of neurological conditions including cases in which the
cerebral hemispheres fail to develop. Capron, supra note 13, at 7.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id. at 8.
80. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
81. Capron, supra note 13, at 8; see Hirsh, supra note 35, at 399. Hirsh states that equat-
ing brain death with death does not necessarily mean that lack of central nervous system
function is the sole criteria of death. Brain death merely recognizes that death means im-
possibility of continued brain function or return to consciousness. Id.
82. See Arras & Shinnar, supra note 19, at 2284.
83. Blakeslee, Law Thwarts Efforts, supra note 10, at 9, col. 5.
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not possess the physical structure required to do so. In this sense
the anencephalic newborn is physically unique and the limited ex-
ception to brain death cannot be broadened if anencephaly is spe-
cifically defined. In addition anencephalic newborns meet the phil-
osophical standards underlying brain death when we define death
as the irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain.84
Anencephalic newborns and irreversibly comatose patients
Black's Law Dictionary defines natural death as "a death which
occurs by the unassisted operation of natural causes";85 violent
death, on the other hand, is "one caused or accelerated by the in-
terference of human agency" 86 and may be considered homicide.
Under the current definition of death, removal of vital organs from
anencephalic newborns or non-brain-dead patients is violent death
and is illegal. Removal of life support from non-brain-dead pa-
tients is not violent death because it will not cause or accelerate
the natural death process.
Brain death, in contrast to irreversible coma, is the total de-
struction or absence of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem. In irreversibly comatose patients who are not sus-
tained by life support, some brain functioning still exists in the
lower brain and maintains vital functions . 7 Like the anencephalic
newborn, recovery of consciousness by an irreversibly comatose pa-
tient is impossible, but the "body" is still alive so that neither of
84. Foreman, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added). "Any pronouncement of death is a
statement of the impossibility of continued brain function, return of consciousness and in-
teraction of the patient with his or her environment." Hirsh, supra note 35, at 399.
85. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 361 (5th ed. 1979).
86. Id. The distinction lies in the difference between killing and letting die, one being an
affirmative act and the other a passive act. The difference centers around causation, whether
the disease or defect leads to death versus whether the act of the intervening agent leads to
death. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND Bi-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Re-
port on the Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions, ch. 2, at 63-64, 68
(1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
87. See Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 426 n.6, 601 P.2d 1072, 1076 n.6 (1979); In
re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983). "'Patients in a persistent vegetative
state have relatively intact brain stem functioning (vegetative functions such as breathing)
but no cerebral cortical functioning at all, such as awareness of self or others or any degree
of cognition.' "Id. at 457 n.3, 464 A.2d at 305 n.3 (quoting Cranford, Ethical Viewpoint of a
Neurologist, 45 CONN. MED. 722 (1981)).
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the two patients is recognized as dead.88 Unlike the irreversibly co-
matose patient, however, the anencephalic newborn is dying be-
cause its vital functions gradually deteriorate until respiration
ceases. This decline begins as soon as the infant is born and initi-
ates a progression toward a certainty of death, which often occurs
within days of birth. 9
Organ Transplantation
Under common law, the individual has no property right in his
or her body nor an absolute right to dictate the use or disposition
of his or her body after death.90 Relatives receive legal custody of
the body to ensure both proper burial and peaceful repose after
burial, and possess the right to sue for damages for any harm or
indecency done to the body.9 1 These standards also bind relatives,
who can be held liable for failure to carry out their duty to protect
the body.9 2 No common law decision or precedent clearly permits
an individual to donate organs for transplant purposes. The need
to overcome these limitations on the use of postmortem bodies for
scientific and medical purposes led to statutory enactments per-
mitting organ donations.9 3 Before promulgation of the Uniform
88. Hirsh, supra note 35, at 394.
89. See supra notes 12-27 and accompanying text. The brain stem has in some cases actu-
ally recovered or improved after a traumatic injury by healing itself to maintain the vital
functions necessary for survival of the individual. This tendency has led to a characteriza-
tion of the brain stem as a primitive "'built-in survival mechanism."' D. MEYERS, supra
note 23, § 4:2 (quoting Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1980)). Medical testimony establishes that "if a patient with a brain stem injury
is kept alive long enough there is generally a tendency to recover functions adequate for a
vegetative existence." Id. In contrast, the upper brain, which regulates higher functions, is
less likely to recover. Id. Under the Loma Linda Medical Center program of placing
anencephalic newborns on respirators for one week, see supra note 10, one of the eleven
infants lived for two months after removal from the respirator, prompting doctors to fear
that use of the life support promoted survival in a vegetative state. Blakeslee, Infant Trans-
plant, supra note 10, at 7, col. 2.
90. D. MEYERs, supra note 23, § 17:4.
91. Id. § 17:5.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 17:7. Because of the common law proscriptions, grave robbery became the regu-
lar practice for obtaining dead bodies for use in medical research, dissection and education.
Early statutes made it a felony to disinter corpses, but the courts were generally more leni-
ent if the offender sought the body for educational rather than commercial purposes. Id. §
17:6.
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Anatomical Gift Act of 1968,91 forty-four states had enacted some
type of legislation providing for organ donations.9 5 The disparity
among these statutes created a need for a uniform policy.9 6
No comprehensive federal regulation of organ transplantation
exists. State law still controls unless the transplant involves re-
search or is federally funded.97 All fifty states and the District of
Columbia have adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968
(UAGA), which was designed to promote and facilitate organ dona-
tion at death.98 The UAGA prescribes who may make organ dona-
tions, who may receive them, and how the donation must be exe-
cuted.9 The UAGA does not, however, define death; most states
have enacted brain death statutes that define the time of death,
thereby determining when transplant surgeons may remove organs
without civil or criminal liability.100 The UAGA also exempts a
transplant surgeon from liability if he acts in good faith when re-
moving organs from a body.10 1 In addition, the UAGA requires the
separation of the physician who determines death from the physi-
cian performing the transplant surgery in order to minimize any
potential conflict of interest.0 2 In 1987, in an attempt to meet the
demand for organs, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws drafted various amendments to the UAGA to
94. 8A U.L.A. 15 (1983 & Supp. 1989). The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws adopted the UAGA in 1968.
95. See D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 17:10.
96. Id.
97. Francis, Artificial and Transplanted Organs: Movable Parts and the Unmoving Law,
11 J. CONTEMP. L. 29, 38-39 (1984).
98. See D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 17:11 (Supp. 1988). For a table listing the jurisdic-
tions where and when the Act has been adopted, see UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT OF 1968,
8A U.L:A. 15-16 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
99. Id. §§ 2-4, 8A U.L.A. 15, 34-55 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
100. D. MEYERS, supra note 23, §§ 4:7, 16:4-:5 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
101. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT ACT OF 1968 § 7(c), 8A U.L.A. 15, 59-60 (1983). "A person
who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this Act or with the anatomical gift laws
of another state ... is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in
any criminal proceeding for his act." Id.
102. Id. § 7(b), 8A U.L.A. at 59. "The time of death shall be determined by a physician
who tends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death. The
physician shall not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part." Id.
Some states require that two independent physicians confirm the diagnosis of death when it
is based on the irreversible cessation of brain function. D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 17:11.
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further simplify the donation process."' Certain guidelines, how-
ever, continue to limit the donation process, including the require-
ment of donor consent.
Consent
Informed consent of the donor or the donor's next of kin is the
most important prerequisite to organ donation. This is seldom a
problem with anencephalic donors because parents usually initiate
the offer to donate their child's organs in a desire to derive some
"good" from a tragic situation.104 The consent issue becomes im-
portant, however, when the focus shifts from the presence of pa-
rental consent to protecting the rights of the newborn, whose inter-
ests may differ from those of the parents.
Parental consent
As a general rule in cases of consent to medical treatment, in
nonemergency situations parental consent is required before a mi-
nor may receive medical care.1 0 5 Medical treatment without such
consent constitutes a battery.106 The rights to "custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents,"'0 7 and are based on
the constitutional protection of privacy. 10 8 The United States Su-
preme Court commented on the role of parental consent in Bowen
103. See D. MEvaRs, supra note 23, § 17:11 (Supp. 1988).
104. Clapp, supra note 1, at 14; Rovner, supra note 1, at 16; see supra note 9 and accom-
panying text.
105. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d
493, 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Some jurisdictions recognize exceptions to the requirement
of obtaining parental consent prior to the treatment of minors. In some states parental con-
sent is implied in emergency situations. In other jurisdictions, under a "mature minor" rule
the court permits the minor himself to consent if, after analyzing the nature and conse-
quences of the treatment, its anticipated benefit to the minor, and the minor's ability to
comprehend fully what the treatment entails, the court finds the minor mature enough to
decide. E.g., Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883, 484 P.2d 1345, 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8
(1971). For a discussion of these two exceptions, see generally D. MEYERs, supra note 23, §
6:2.
106. Bonner, 126 F.2d at 122. But see D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 6:2 (outlining excep-
tions to the general rule).
107. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
108. Id.
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v. American Hospital Association"0 9 saying, "In broad outline,
state law vests decisional responsibility in the parents, in the first
instance, subject to review in exceptional cases by the State acting
as parens patriae." 0 This parental prerogative is not absolute,
however, and does not permit the parents to "expose... the child
...to ill health or death.""' In such cases, the state may inter-
vene under its parens patriae power to protect the interests of the
infant. Courts have traditionally recognized the well-being of the
child as the paramount right." 2 Ordinarily, courts will respect the
parents' right to privacy and uphold their treatment decision if it
falls within the boundaries of accepted medical treatment stan-
dards.1 3  Regarding treatment decisions of severely defective
newborns, the courts apply different standards and rarely overturn
the decisions of parents and attending physicians." 4 In its report,
the President's Commission on Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining
Treatment concluded that parents, in consultation with their phy-
sician, are the proper decisionmakers regarding treatment of se-
verely defective newborns, but their discretion is limited in that
they cannot choose a course of nontreatment that is "clearly
against the infant's best interests.""'
A few cases have recognized the requirement of parental consent
to surgical invasion of a child for the benefit of another. In Bonner
109. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
110. Id. at 627. The Court went on to say:
First, there is a presumption, strong but rebuttable, that parents are the ap-
propriate decisionmakers for their infants. Traditional law concerning the fam-
ily, buttressed by the emerging constitutional right of privacy, protects a sub-
stantial range of discretion for parents. Second, as persons unable to protect
themselves, infants fall under the parens patriae power of the state. In the
exercise of this authority, the state not only punishes parents whose conduct
hbs amounted to abuse or neglect of their children, but may also supervene
parental decisions before they become operative to ensure that the choices
made are not so detrimental to a child's interests as to amount to neglect and
abuse.
Id. at n.13.
111. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). Parents may not exercise "life
and death authority over their children." Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 748, 379
N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (1978).
112. D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 13:2.
113. See id. § 13:4 (Supp. 1988).
114. See id. § 14:3 (Supp. 1988).
115. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 86, at 6; see id. at 214-23.
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v. Moran,"i ' a mother sued a physician for assault and battery
when the physician performed a skin graft on her minor son, with-
out the mother's consent, for the benefit of the minor's cousin. The
court held for the mother, noting that the minor missed two
months of school, suffered serious pain and possible permanent
disfigurement and did not have a mature enough mind to under-
stand the consequences of his donation.117 In Zaman v. Schultz,""
the parents sued a physician for taking considerable quantities of
blood from their minor daughter, without parental consent, in or-
der to benefit the wife of the minor's employer. Finding for the
parents, the court noted, as in the case above, that the taking did
not benefit the minor nor the parents." 9 Both courts focused on
informed consent and the inability of the minor to understand and
make a reasoned choice. 120 Both courts also presumed, by implica-
tion, that in these situations the parents, if given the opportunity
to consent, would have acted to protect the best interests of their
minor child and denied the physical invasion. Subsequent cases,
however, modified this point of view by noting that in some situa-
tions the minor's best interests conflicted with the parents' inter-
ests, and parental consent alone was not sufficient to permit bodily
invasions of a minor.' 2 ' In these cases, and most cases involving
incompetents or minors, the court appointed a guardian ad litem
to protect the child's or incompetent's interests from the compet-
ing interests of parents or society.'
Judicial consent
In reviewing decisions regarding medical treatment of minors
and incompetents, the courts have used two overlapping standards
116. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
117. Id. at 123.
118. 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (1932).
119. Id. at 312.
120. Id. at 311; Bonner, 126 F.2d at 122.
121. See infra notes 227-36 and accompanying text.
122. See D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 15:3. The guardian's charge should be to "assure
that the interests of the patient are indeed protected by a neutral and detached party
wholly free of self-interest." Id. (quoting In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 477, 426 N.Y.S.2d
517, 550 (1980), modified, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981)).
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of review under the parens patriae power of the state. 23 Under
the "best interests" standard, the court first determines and then
acts to protect the best interests of the patient involved. 2 4 Under
the doctrine of "substituted judgment," the court substitutes its
judgment for that of the individual by first determining the indi-
vidual's wants and needs and then deciding in the same manner it
believes the individual would decide if he or she were capable. 12 5
In Strunk v. Strunk,'26 a case in which the donor was an incom-
petent ward of the state, a Kentucky court of appeals held that a
chancery court has sufficient inherent power under common law to
authorize the surgical invasion of the ward to benefit another.
Under the parens patriae power, the court utilized both the sub-
stituted judgment and best interests standards of review in reach-
ing its decision. In Strunk, a mother sought permission from the
court to proceed with the transplantation of a kidney from her 27-
year-old incompetent son to his unhealthy 28-year-old brother. 27
In attempting to reach the same decision the incompetent would
123. In cases to determine whether to withdraw life support, courts have asserted the
power to order the withdrawal of treatment from a patient unable to give consent under
several different theories: (1) parens patriae; (2) inherent equity power, or the obligation to
decide questions of values and rights raised by modern medical technology; (3) legislative
statutes conferring authority on the judiciary to make specific decisions; (4) power to exer-
cise and protect the constitutional right of privacy of an incompetent patient including pro-
tection from nonconsensual bodily invasions. Annotation, Judicial Power to Order Discon-
tinuance of Life-Sustaining Treatment, 48 A.L.R. 4th 67, 79-81 (1986).
124. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 365, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985).
125. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 44, 355 A.2d 647, 664, 666 (citing Hart v. Brown, 29
Conn. Supp. 368, 370, 289 A.2d 386, 387-88 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) and Strunk v. Strunk,
445 S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (Ky. 1969)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See Classen, The
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment in Its Medicolegal Context, 1985 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q.
452. Regarding defective newborns and who should make treatment decisions for them, one
author stated:
'One way would be to ask, as the Quinlan court did, what the defective new-
born would decide were he capable of doing so. We might want to ask why a
defective child might want to die .... But this is already a false question
because ... we are in grave danger of injecting our own values onto the child
who has absolutely no basis for the fears and horrors we might have for our-
selves in a similar state. We project our values onto the child by this quality of
life argument .... We are in grave danger of confusing our suffering ... with
that of the child who has never known any other existence....
P. RIGA, RIGHT TO DIE OR RIGHT To LIvE? LEGAL ASPECTS OF DYING AND DEATH 155-56 (1981)
(footnotes omitted).
126. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
127. Id. at 146.
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have made himself, the court noted that the incompetent was
greatly dependent upon his brother emotionally and psychologi-
cally and upon his brother's visits to the nursing home; that kidney
transplants were highly successful and not dangerous to the donor;
and that the incompetent was the only available donor within the
family. 128 In light of this overwhelming evidence, the court found
the incompetent would have wanted to donate his kidney to his
brother.129
The court blended the two standards of review by first determin-
ing the incompetent's best interests and then presuming he would
act in those interests. Because kidney transplant surgery is a major
bodily invasion, the court surmised that a potential donor would
not consent ordinarily unless some substantial good would result,
such as saving the life of a loved one. i30 Courts usually protect in-
competents under the substituted judgment doctrine by permitting
a bodily invasion and transplant to a sibling only upon a clear
showing that the transplant is essential to prevent the sibling's im-
minent death or will result in a substantial benefit to the donor .'3
Generally, courts have limited the use of substituted judgment to
urgent medical necessities in which a high probability of success
exists along with a clear duty to act, and the best interests of the
donor, not the interests of others, require it. 132
128. Id. at 146-49.
129. Id.; see Classen, supra note 125, at 461. In a subsequent case based on Strunk, a
mother sought court authorization to consent to a kidney transplant from her 14-year-old
Down's Syndrome daughter to the girl's younger brother who was dying of renal disease.
The court granted permission after finding psychological benefits to the girl based on her
close relationship with her brother. Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 498-99 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979). But see In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. App. 1973), in which the court
denied authorization for a kidney transplant from a 17-year-old incompetent boy to his 32-
year-old sister because no evidence was shown that the woman was terminal or that the
transplant was required to save her life.
130. See 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1969).
131. D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 11:15.
132. See, e.g., In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264-67, 426 A.2d 467, 482-83 (1981); see also
Classen, supra note 125, at 463. A Pennsylvania court refused to force an unwilling donor to
donate healthy bone marrow to his cousin who was dying of aplastic anemia. The transplant
would have improved the donee's chances of survival by 40-60% and would have involved
little discomfort to the donor. The court found that such an intrusion, no matter how minor,
without the donor's consent would violate bodily sanctity and could not be compelled. See
D. MEYERs, supra note 23, § 17:3 n.14 (citing Santa Barbara News Press, July 27, 1978, at
C.14; id., Aug. 11, 1978, at A.5.).
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Social goals of organ donation
Since the 1950s, pure volunteerism has been the means of ob-
taining organs for transplant purposes.1 3 Shortages caused by an
increasing demand for organs eventually led in the late 1960s to a
campaign of encouraged volunteerism that involved massive pub-
licity designed to promote donations. 34 Volunteerism represented
a praiseworthy policy choice in that it encouraged socially desira-
ble virtues, such as altruism and benevolence, without the risk of
abusing individual rights or free choice. 13 5 Because encouraged
volunteerism has failed to meet the increasing need for organs,
however, some scholars have suggested a policy of presumed con-
sent in which organs are donated automatically unless the next of
kin objects or the donor is carrying a card prohibiting such a tak-
ing. 36 Proponents of presumed consent argue that true informed
consent is a charade because bereaved families must make a dona-
tion decision under psychologically wrenching conditions in a short
period of time. 37
In the case of anencephalic donors, when the fetus is diagnosed
as anencephalic, the parents choose most often to abort. 38 When
the parents choose to continue the pregnancy with the intention of
donating the organs of the newborn, the decision is usually fully
informed because the parents have had time to fully consider their
decision. 3 9 Furthermore, the advantages of aborting often signifi-
cantly outweigh the advantages of continuing the pregnancy: First,
the odds are high the child will be stillborn;140 and second, the
physical risks to the mother are greater for a normal childbirth
133. Caplan, Organ Transplants: The Costs of Success, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec.
1983, at 23.
134. Id. at 23-24.
135. Id. at 24.
136. Id. at 23.
137. Id. at 25-26.
138. Supra note 8 and accompanying text.
139. In 1987, Loma Linda University Medical Center received 50 requests from parents
that they be permitted to donate their anencephalic child's organs. Persistent pleas led the
hospital to consider the use of such donors. Blakeslee, New Attention Focused on Infant
Donor Organs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1987, § A, at 18, col. 1.
140. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 21.
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than for an early abortion.141 This type of fully informed volunteer
organ donation thus fulfills the social policy goal of encouraging
altruistic behavior and also directly benefits society by preserving
the donee's life.
The relative scarcity of infant donors has further augmented a
growing demand for pediatric organs resulting from new transplant
techniques. 14 2 The difficulty of diagnosing brain death in newborns
and the rarity of finding infant donors who have lost brain func-
tion but retain other organs intact has led physicians to look to the
possible use of anencephalic donors. 4 3 Today, the brain death re-
quirement effectively eliminates the availability of anencephalic
organs. 44 In October 1986, New Jersey Assemblyman Walter Kern,
Jr., attempted to overcome the stringent demand of this require-
ment by proposing an amendment to the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act that would permit parents to donate the organs of their
anencephalic newborn before brain death.145
141. See, e.g., Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion Infor-
mation and the First Amendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1933 n.108 (1988); Note, Reli-
gion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59
N.Y.U. L. REv. 301, 403 (1984).
142. Approximately 2,500 infants a year are born needing a transplant. Colen, supra note
1, at 12. Approximately 1,500 infants a year die without receiving a needed heart or liver
transplant. Foreman, supra note 1, at 1. In early May 1987, 243 children under age 5 were
awaiting organs, with 24 of the 243 under the age of 1. Up to 50% of potential donees under
the age of 2 die waiting for organs. Dunn, supra note 1, at 3, col. 4.
143. Shewmon, supra note 8, at 1773. Diagnostic criteria for infant brain death has not
yet been validated and is much more difficult to attain than in older patients. Id. So little is
known about the nervous system of newborns less than 7 days old that no accepted brain
death definition can be formulated. Blakeslee, supra note 138, § A, at 18, col. 1. A brain
death definition is even harder to formulate in anencephalic newborns who lack parts of the
brain necessary for diagnostic assessment. Id. Because physicians do not know for certain
whether legal brain death has occurred, Loma Linda University Medical Center protocol
called for removing anencephalic newborns from life support periodically to see if spontane-
ous breathing had ceased. Gorman, supra note 1, at 49; see Note, supra note 1, at 1545-46
(outlining the difficulties of determining brain death in young children and anencephalic
infants particularly).
144. Shewmon, supra note 8, at 1780; Steinbrook, Laws Blamed for Dearth of Infant
Organs, L.A. Times, Aug. 10, 1989, at 3, col. 5.
145. See Shewmon, supra note 8, at 1774.
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Competing policy considerations
The post-mortem transplantation decision generally involves a
balancing of two principles: the donor's right to bodily integrity,
including ensuring his or her final wishes are followed, and the sav-
ing of another human life. 146 In the case of anencephalic newborns,
a more accurate description of the transplant decision is the weigh-
ing of the preservation of the bodily integrity of one newborn
against the social value of saving another newborn's life. Implicit
within this balancing test is the correlative issue of whether the
legislatures or courts should permit a decedent or next of kin to
withhold life from the donee. 147 An evaluation of these competing
interests will demonstrate the inherent complexity of the balancing
process in anencephalic donor cases. Deciding how to implement a
transplant policy that provides maximum benefits for all impli-
cates the broader interests of economics, social policy, criminal lia-
bility and ethics. 48
Economic analysis
Under a strict economic analysis, the balancing factors in every
transplant decision break down as follows: On one side is the cost
of permitting useful transplant organs to go unused, the lost value
of allowing a potential donee to die and the cost of maintaining a
potential donee on lifesaving machines. 49 On the other side is the
cost of performing the transplant without consent of the donor or
next of kin and the value of protecting the next of kin from mental
suffering for violation of a relation's corpse.150 Figures suggest that
146. See Dukeminier, Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 811, 818
(1970). The prefatory note to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act lists the principal competing
interests in transplantation cases as
(1) the wishes of the deceased during his lifetime concerning the disposition of
his body; (2) the desires of the surviving spouse or next of kin; (3) the interest
of the state in determining by autopsy, the cause of death in cases involving
crime or violence; ... (5) the need of society for bodies, tissues, and organs for
medical education, research, therapy and transplantation.
UNIF. ANATOMicAL GiFT AcT oF 1968, 8A U.L.A. 15, 16 (1983). This Note focuses on only
those interests and policies in direct conflict with regard to the anencephalic donor issue.
147. Dukeminier, supra note 146, at 818.
148. D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 17:14.
149. Dukeminier, supra note 146, at 821.
150. Id.
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the economic cost of not taking a kidney for transplant and main-
taining a potential donee on dialysis in the first year is several
times that of taking the kidney without consent.151 Jury awards in
wrongful death cases and wrongful autopsy cases also indicate that
juries value human life much more highly than the inviolability of
a corpse.'
52
Anencephalic newborns are not corpses, however, but living be-
ings under the current definition of death. The right against invio-
lability of the body is much stronger in such cases. The economic
balancing must reflect the presence of two lives, one on each side
of the scale, and this fact alters the cost/benefit analysis. In most
anencephalic donor cases, both the anencephalic newborn and the
potential donee have prognoses of certain death. The donation of
the anencephalic organ minimizes the total economic loss inherent
in two deaths by creating an opportunity to save the donee's life.
Due to the permanent loss of higher functions, the anencephalic
newborn offers less potential as a resource to society than the do-
nee whose potential for life becomes significantly increased by re-
ceipt of the transplant organ. The costs to be balanced rest ulti-
mately on a weighing of the value of allowing a potential donee to
die against the mental or ethical cost to society of "taking" a life
with less potential.
Social policy
The general social policy that saving or preserving life should be
given highest priority does not necessarily apply in all cases.1 53 In
some situations society approves the sacrifice of human life for
specific social purposes, such as in times of war154 or when allocat-
ing scarce resources.' 55 The metaphor of triage helps clarify the
competing principles of social utility-the greatest good for the
greatest number-and equality-regarding each life as equal-
inherent in these situations. 156
151. Id. at 823.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 820.
154. Id.
155. See Childress, Triage in Neonatal Intensive Care: The Limitations of a Metaphor,
69 VA. L. REv. 547, 549 (1983).
156. See id.
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Triage grew out of battlefield medicine and is "the practice of
sorting patients according to the urgency of their needs under
emergency conditions in which such needs are likely to be urgent
and medical resources scarce.' 157 This system focuses primarily on
medical needs and medical salvageability and prioritizes patients
to receive scarce resources according to need. 15s In certain situa-
tions, however, social utility factors enter and override medical pri-
ority, as in times of war when the priority sometimes is not to as-
sist the more seriously injured first, but to get those less injured
back to the front quickly where they can aid the common good.15 9
Differing moral values underlie these two types of utility: Medical
utility recognizes the equal value of life without regard to rank or
position in the community, while social utility recognizes the dif-
fering value of each individual to the community. 60 In the case of
the neonatal intensive care unit, commentators who emphasize the
social utility factors in a triage situation have stated that
"'[blecause it is impossible to treat all infants in need, preference
should be given those with the greatest hope of surviving with
maximal function.' ,,161 Other commentators criticize this emphasis
because it requires both an assessment of the patient's social worth
and presents an amorphous definition of "maximal function."' 2
They point out that the common good, which is the focus of social
utility, includes principles and values that are as important as
other social goals. For instance, the common good may value equal-
ity of life more than the interest of promoting the highest quality
of life.16 3
This conflict between medical and social utility exists within the
anencephalic donor issue as well. The transplant situation is an
emergency situation because the needed organ is a scarce resource
and the donee will die shortly if he or she does not receive it. With
157. Id. at 548.
158. Id. at 551. In the most formal triage settings, patients are also sorted by set catego-
ries. Id.
159. Id. at 551-52.
160. Id. at 552-53.
161. Id. at 555 (quoting Jonsen & Garland, A Moral Policy for Life/Death Decisions in
the Intensive Care Nursery, in ETHICS OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 142 (A. Jonsen & M.
Garland eds. 1976)).
162. Id. at 556.
163. Id.
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anencephalic newborns the question is whether to hasten the death
of one life in order to preserve another life. Taking organs from
anencephalic newborns before death would be sacrificing a person
with no probability of survival for a person with a higher certainty
of survival and one of higher maximal function. Under a strict
medical utility perspective, the anencephalic life could not be
taken because each life is of equal value regardless of social worth.
Factoring in social utility criteria, however, requires looking at
what action will benefit the largest number."" Saving the donee's
life places him or her back into the community where he or she
serves as a resource for the common good. Because the
anencephalic newborn will die no matter what action is taken,
utilizing his or her situation to benefit society as a whole makes
social sense.
The question comes down ultimately to a determination of the
common good. On one hand is the value embodied in the preserva-
tion of the donee's life at a level of functioning that enables him or
her to contribute actively to the community. On the other hand is
the value, moral and psychological, of maintaining the dignity and
equality of the anencephalic newborn's life regardless of his or her
social worth. Appeals to social utility generally have a heavy pre-
sumption against them and ordinarily are justified only in certain
situations. 165 In transplant cases, however, the courts have recog-
nized a need to compromise between medical and social utility
principles. Society has placed a high value on scarce organs and
has attempted to encourage donations because it recognizes the so-
cial utility of saved lives.' 6 In living donor transplant cases, the
courts protect the value of equal regard for each life by requiring
that a living donor receive a benefit from bodily invasions. 67 In
some cases, this benefit may even take the form of the donor's
spiritual gain from the heroic act of sacrificing one part of the body
in order to benefit the mental health of the whole. 68 Parents of
164. See id. at 551-52.
165. Id. at 553.
166. See Dukeminier, supra note 146, at 818.
167. See supra notes 116-19, 131 and accompanying text.
168. Dukeminier, supra note 146, at 855 n.172. Often the donor benefits from being per-
mitted to help others, especially when the donee is a close family member. In fact, studies
have shown that "donors feel happier and better about themselves in the first year after
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anencephalic newborns often seek this type of spiritual gain when
they choose to donate the organs of their infant.169
In the case of anencephalic donors, social policy must balance
these competing principles. Societal consensus must determine
which course of action, preserving the life of the anencephalic new-
born or saving the life of the donee, has a higher value to the com-
mon good. A carefully structured anencephalic donation policy can
mediate between these competing principles and achieve an out-
come that takes into account social priorities in emergency situa-
tions while preserving the dignity of the anencephalic newborn.
Criminal liability
A transplant surgeon may be liable for aggravated assault or
homicide should he or she take an organ from an anencephalic
newborn who has not been declared legally dead. 170 Criminal homi-
cide refers to the unlawful killing of another human being and is
usually classified as either murder or manslaughter. 71 Murder re-
quires malice aforethought 7 2 or deliberate intent to take a life,
whereas the lesser charge of manslaughter does not require deliber-
ation or premeditation. 7 3 Malice exists when the actor intends to
take the life of anyone, including but not limited to the actual vic-
tim. 174 A jury can thus convict a transplant surgeon of homicide
even though he or she does not harbor an evil motive toward the
specific donor. 175 Nor will a humanitarian or well-intentioned mo-
tive, such as to relieve pain and suffering, absolve an actor from
liability if his or her intent was to end the patient's life. 76 Even if
successful transplant surgery." Starzl, Will Live Organ Donations No Longer Be Justified?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1985, at 5.
169. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
170. See Hirsch, supra note 35, at 395.
171. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1 (2d ed. 1986).
172. Id. The common law definition of murder is the "unlawful killing of another 'living
human being' with 'malice aforethought.'" Id.
173. Id. § 7.9.
174. D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 7:5.
175. Id. § 7:6.
176. Id. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court stated this principle:
"The actor's motive, no matter how kindly, is legally irrelevant, and this remains true not-
withstanding the fact that the consent of the deceased had been obtained, or that the actor
firmly believed his conduct to be morally justified." In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 450, 426
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the victim was near death and the actor merely accelerated its on-
set, he or she still would be liable. 77 Consent of the victim cannot
serve as a defense, excuse or provocation, nor will it change the
characterization of the crime to a lesser degree of homicide. 78
Under criminal law, one cannot consent to one's own death nor, in
some cases, to the infliction of serious bodily injury upon oneself.1 79
Under current law, then, parents of anencephalic newborns cannot
consent to the death of their child by the removal of organs for
donative purposes. A transplant surgeon likewise cannot claim pa-
rental consent nor humanitarian motives as a defense to killing a
human being. The transplant surgeon can take organs from an
anencephalic donor legally, however, if a statute permits the tak-
ing. 80 Justifiable homicide is defined as "[a]n act which the law
positively.., permits [an actor] to perform."' 81 A legislative enact-
ment exempting transplant surgeons and parents from criminal
sanctions in anencephalic donor cases would authorize an act that
current law forbids.
When a transplant surgeon takes an organ from a living donor
and faces aggravated assault or homicide charges, he or she may
claim the common law defense of justification.'82 The Model Penal
Code states that an action is justifiable when "the harm or evil
sought to be avoided by such conduct [the donee's death in this
case] is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defin-
N.Y.S.2d 517, 533 (1980), modified, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, (1981)
(citations omitted).
177. D. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 7:8.
Liability is imposed regardless of whether the victim had a normal lifespan
ahead of him or faced imminent death .... The crucial factor that must be
ascertained is whether the physician's action was intended to accelerate death.
If it was, then it is criminal. However, where the physician's actions simply
allow death to occur from existing natural causes, there is no acceleration of
death and no criminal liability.
Id. (citations omitted).
178. Id. § 7:9.
179. Dukeminier, supra note 146, at 852.
180. See id. at 854-55.
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (5th ed. 1979).
182. Dukeminier, supra note 146, at 855. Black's Law Dictionary defines justification as
"maintaining or showing a sufficient reason in court why the defendant did what he is called
upon to answer, particularly . . . as a defense to criminal charges of assault or homicide
.... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (5th ed. 1979).
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ing the offense charged [the taking of the anencephalic life]." ''
The judge or jury balances the evils and, in view of the alternatives
available, decides whether the plight of the organ recipient in
transplant cases outweighs the risk of the donor's death or impair-
ment.6 4 In the case of anencephalic donors, a transplant surgeon
could argue that the transplant results in a greater overall quan-
tum of good because it saves another life and the parents receive a
mental health benefit by sacrificing their anencephalic newborn to
aid another. This argument, however, lacks the certainty of lawful
excuse that is present with statutory permission to conduct the
transplant.
Ethical principles
The categorical divisions among philosophers who write about
normative ethics parallel the split in the moral perspectives re-
garding the anencephalic donor issue. The rule-oriented ethicist
has pre-set rules that define how members of society ought to be-
have to preserve society, and he or she looks to these rules to de-
cide specific cases. I8 5 The consequentialist ethicist, on the other
hand, looks at a situation to determine its consequences, whether
benefits will result and if so, to whom.' Consequentialists are
subdivided further. Utilitarians take an empiricist perspective and
believe the right action is the one that will provide the greatest
good for the greatest number.'8 7 Situationist ethicists look at indi-
vidual situations and attempt to work out consequences that are in
the best interests of a particular patient.'88
The Hippocratic rules that underlie the medical profession are
"(1) to save or preserve life at all costs, (2) to relieve suffering, and
(3) to do no harm to the patient."'8 9 With today's technology, the
rule of saving life at all costs often conflicts with the other two
183. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
184. Dukeminier, supra note 146, at 855.
185. Towers, Ethical and Legal Responsibilities of the Physician Toward the Dying
Newborn, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PA-
TIENTS 228, 232 (1982).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 232-33.
189. Id. at 233.
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rules; for example, successful resuscitation of a patient may actu-
ally prolong pain and suffering and cause harm to the patient.9 0
Before blindly applying a rule, physicians should consider other
factors, including potential consequences to, and the best interests
of, the patient involved. Regarding application of the rule "to save
or preserve life at all costs" in anencephalic donor cases, the ques-
tion becomes whether the physician should save the life of the do-
nee or preserve the life of the anencephalic newborn. If the physi-
cian takes the anencephalic organ, he or she harms the donor. If
the physician does not take the organ, he or she, in effect, harms
the donee. Some philosophers see no moral difference between the
act of letting someone die, which is intentional and deliberate if
the actor is in a position to save the life, and the act of killing.19
Moral responsibility attaches to the act of doing nothing in the
same way it attaches to the act of doing something. 92 In the case
of anencephalic donors, if the two newborn lives are of equal in-
trinsic value, the act of killing the anencephalic newborn or of let-
ting the donee newborn die has the same consequence, a lost life,
in either case. The utilitarian would favor the transplant because
instead of two certain deaths, it provides one certain death and
one probable life, a greater quantum of overall good. 9 3 In contrast,
the situationist would focus on the best interests of the
anencephalic newborn and the immediate family in deciding on a
course of action.19 4
Under the general ethical principle of preservation of life, a per-
son should not endanger his or her own life unless he or she acts
for the love of another, or the danger results indirectly from his or
her own actions. 95 The law parallels this principle by not creating
a duty to aid another if such actions would place oneself in dan-
190. Id.
191. Rachels, Euthanasia, Killing, and Letting Die, in ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO LIFE
AND DEATH 146, 153 (J. Ladd, ed. 1979).
192. Id.
193. See Towers, supra note 185, at 232. But see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4
(1971) ("Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for
some is made right by a greater good shared by others.").
194. See Towers, supra note 185, at 232-33.
195. Dukeminier, supra note 146, at 857.
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ger. 19 Society condones an exception to this principle, however,
when one acts in self-sacrifice solely from the desire to help others
and not for financial gain.197 Under this principle, parents of an
anencephalic newborn are giving up the limited life of their infant
in an act of self-sacrifice when they donate the newborn's organs.
The motive is purely charitable; the parents receive no gain other
than the psychological benefit of acting to aid another. In such
cases, society also benefits indirectly from the altruistic acts of its
members."'8
Privacy Rights
Every person in the United States is entitled to the protections
guaranteed by the United States Constitution including the right
of privacy. 99 This right of privacy includes a parental right of dis-
cretion in raising their children and the right to exercise their
child's privacy rights.200 A presumption that the parents will act in
their child's best interests underlies the exercise of these rights. In
the case of anencephalic donors, however, parent and child privacy
rights come into conflict.
Personhood
The Supreme Court has interpreted the United States Constitu-
tion to require live birth as the accepted criterion for recognition
as a "person." 0' An anencephalic newborn lacks the physical capa-
196. See Handiboe v. McCarthy, 114 Ga. App. 541, 543, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1966); Yania
v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 321-22, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (1959).
197. Dukeminier, supra note 146, at 858.
198. Starzl, supra note 168, at 5. See generally Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs
of Strangers, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1987, at 30-38 (discussing the cultural meaning of
organ donation).
199. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (stating that the right of privacy is
a peripheral right emanating from the penumbras of several fundamental constitutional
guarantees).
200. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
201. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). In Roe the Court stated:
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. [The Court
then listed each provision in which the word appears.] But in nearly all these
instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally.
None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal applica-
tion. All this, together with our observation . . . that throughout the major
portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer
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bility of ever achieving higher brain activity, including conscious-
ness and intelligent thought, which many consider the essence of
being human. 02 This situation is clearly different from an irrevers-
ibly comatose patient who once had higher brain functions but has
now lost them, or from the severely retarded or demented individ-
ual who still retains some level of consciousness and awareness. If
legislatures or courts define anencephalic newborns as "nonper-
sons" with no legal protection under the fourteenth amendment,
surgeons could remove the newborns' organs for transplant pur-
poses without criminal liability. The problem with this approach,
however, is the lack of consensus regarding what constitutes per-
sonhood or being human. 03 The law has drawn an arbitrary line on
the continuum of human development at the moment of birth to
distinguish between abortion and infanticide and has granted the
than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.
Id. at 157-58.
202. Harrison, supra note 3, at 21; see Raphael, Handicapped Infants: Medical Ethics
and the Law, 14 J. MED. ETHICS, 8, 8 (1988); cf. Note, Brain Birth: A Proposal for Defining
When a Fetus is Entitled to Human Life Status, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1069 (1986) (pro-
posing that a fetus should acquire personhood and legal protection at the point when ne-
ocortical brain activity begins because intellectual functioning is a uniquely human charac-
teristic). Some scholars suggest criteria for personhood that would exclude anencephalic
newborns. See Fletcher, Four Indicators of Humanhood-The Inquiry Matters, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Dec. 1974, at 5-6. Fletcher's four criteria for "personhood" include neocortical
function, self consciousness, relational ability, and happiness. He argues that neocortical
function is the key to humanness and is necessary for the presence of the other listed traits.
Id. According to Fletcher, without neocortical functioning a person is nonexistent. Id. at 6.
203. Harrison, supra note 3, at 22.
[O]ne might argue that the possession of or capacity to exercise rights is
dependent on the capacity to experience the consequences of exercising the
rights in question. In other words, the capacity to take an interest in something
might be crucial to being able to have a right regarding that thing. Since the
comatose person cannot know life at all, especially a comatose infant who has
never known it, he cannot properly be said to have an interest or a right in this
regard at all. As such, no moral wrong is done in not saving his life. On this
view, the possession of rights exists along a spectrum; while the comatose per-
son may experience pain or even hunger, and may have rights based on such
capacities, he may not have other capacities necessary to having other rights.
R. SHERLOCK, PRESERVING LIF PUBLIC POLICY AND THE LIFE NOT WORTH LIVING 104-05
(1987).
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abnormal newborn more protection than the abnormal fetus.2"4 De-
fining anencephalic newborns as "nonpersons" requires certain
safeguards including absolute accuracy of diagnosis and progno-
sis.2 °5 The absence of the brain or cerebral hemispheres, however,
is always an unambiguous diagnosis.0 6 The strongest policy argu-
ments against this definition are that it demeans the product of
human conception and creates a danger of extending the classifica-
tion of nonperson to other less severely handicapped newborns.20 7
A better method of dealing with the legal status of anencephalic
newborns may be to create a new definition, with the same legal
implications as brain death, called "brain absent. '208 Such a cate-
gory treats the anencephalic newborn as a person who, because of a
physical deficiency, is the equivalent of "brain dead."20 Legisla-
tures and courts can narrowly define this category to limit it to
anencephalic newborns without risk of it expanding to include
those with less severe handicaps. 2 0 Because this category treats
the anencephalic newborn as a person and a full member of the
moral community deserving of respect, transplant surgeons may
take the infant's organs only if the taking is done without the in-
fant suffering and without violating the infant's right to die natu-
rally by prolonging life unnecessarily.21' Under this definition the
anencephalic newborn cannot be maintained artificially solely to
recover organs or to serve as a means to benefit another because
this would violate the moral law that persons possess an intrinsic
worth that society cannot reduce to an instrumental value to
others.212
204. Raphael, supra note 202, at 8; see supra note 201 and accompanying text. Under
well-accepted medical practice, physicians may abort an anencephalic fetus right up until
the moment of birth. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 22; Rovner, supra note 1, at 16.
205. Capron, supra note 13, at 9.
206. See Dunn, supra note 1, at 3, col. 4; supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
207. Harrison, supra note 3, at 22; see supra notes 73-80 and infra notes 254-61, and
accompanying text.
208. See Arras & Shinnar, supra note 19, at 2284; Harrison, supra note 3, at 21.
209. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 21.
210. Id. at 21.
211. See Arras & Shinnar, supra note 19, at 2284.
212. See id.
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Rights conflict
One can define rights as the claims an individual can make
against the collectivity.21 In the case of anencephalic newborns,
the privacy rights of the parent and the child are in conflict. Only
the parent may exercise the child's privacy rights; 14 however, in
exercising the child's privacy right, including the right to control
the child's body, the parents' choice to donate an anencephalic
newborn's organs is at odds with the child's natural right to life
and treatment.1 5 The danger inherent in such a choice is that the
parents will decide in their own self interest and not the child's.1 6
Another danger is that focusing solely on the beneficial conse-
quences of taking the anencephalic child's organs will blur respect
for the individual rights of the child;217 such an emphasis tends to
subvert the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the laws
by creating social worth criteria for ending a life.21 8 Conservatives
claim that the principal criterion implicated in treatment decisions
is the child's right to life. 19 If the state enters the decision process
to protect the rights of the child, it interferes with the privacy
rights of the parents in both raising their children and in exercis-
ing their child's privacy rights and with the public policy presump-
tion that parents will act in the best interests of their child.22 °
213. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 151, 151
(1988) (citing M. Ignatieff, Professor of Law, University of Michigan).
214. See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
215. See Schneider, supra note 213, at 166-73.
216. Note, Withholding Treatment from Defective Infants: "Infant Doe" Postmortem, 59
NOTRE DAhiE L. REV. 224, 227-29 (1983).
217. See Raphael, supra note 202, at 9.
218. See Schneider, supra note 213, at 170-71; cf. Robertson, Discretionary Non-Treat-
ment of Defective Newborns, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 451, 458 (1975) ("Caring for defec-
tive newborns ... reinforces societal commitment to values of life, equality, and the non-
allocation of rights by meritocratic or other discriminatory principles and thus produces
respect for the life and moral equality of all persons.").
219. Schneider, supra note 213, at 166.
220. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979), which states that
[t]he law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recog-
nized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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In In re Guardianship of Barry,221 a case in which parents
sought court authorization to discontinue life support of their co-
matose non-brain-dead infant, the Florida Court of Appeals held
that the parents could validly assert the privacy interest of their
10-month-old terminally ill infant. The court exercised substituted
judgment 222 "guided primarily" by the judgment of the parents
who were responsible for their child's well-being. 23 Because finan-
cial constraints did not motivate the parents' decision, competent
medical evidence supported their decision and their consent was
fully informed, the court found that the state's interest in prolong-
ing the life of the infant did not override the infant's best inter-
ests, which required removal of the infant's life support. 24 The
court based its decision on the fact that the infant's condition was
irreversible, with no reasonable medical probability of gaining a
cognitive state.225 The court also declined to require judicial review
in every case concerning withdrawal of life support from a non-
brain-dead infant, asserting that the decision traditionally be-
longed with the infant's parents and their advisors. 226
In contrast, in In re Grady,221 a case in which parents sought
authorization to have their Down's Syndrome daughter sterilized,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that "[ilt must be the court's
judgment, and not just the parents' good faith decision, that sub-
stitutes for the incompetent's consent. ' 228 The court retained the
221. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
222. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.




Finally, while the issue is not squarely before us, the state has requested that
we require judicial review before life support can be withheld from a non-
brain-dead child. We decline to so hold as we recognize that decisions of this
character have traditionally been made within the privacy of the family rela-
tionship based on competent medical advice and consultation by the family
with their religious advisors, if that be their persuasion.
Id. But see John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983), which states, "[O]ur holding necessarily rejects appellants' position that
court approval should not be necessary. In our judgment an application by the court-ap-
pointed guardian of a comatose and terminally ill individual requires review by a court of
competent jurisdiction before life sustaining procedures may be suspended."
227. 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
228. Id. at 251, 426 A.2d at 475.
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power to make a final determination of a medical treatment deci-
sion, stating that the parens patriae power allowed the state to
intervene to protect those who could not protect themselves. 2 29
Recognizing the difficulties of determining the best interests of an
incompetent patient, the court stated: "We do not pretend that the
choice of her parents, her guardian ad litem or a court is her own
choice. But it is a genuine choice nevertheless-one designed to
further the same interests she might pursue had she the ability to
decide herself."230 A number of courts are deferring to the family
as the proper institution to assess the patient's best interests be-
cause no acceptable objective criteria exist to determine a patient's
best interests. 31 While acknowledging that the weight of authority
was against it, the court in Grady claimed inherent power to inter-
vene to protect the important constitutional privacy right of the
incompetent.2 32
In a California case that followed the reasoning of Barry, In re
Phillip B.,23 s the court held that the right of privacy protects pa-
229. Id. at 259, 426 A.2d at 479. "Where an incompetent person lacks the mental capacity
to make [a] choice, a court should ensure the exercise of that right on behalf of the incom-
petent in a matter that reflects his or her best interests." Id. at 252, 426 A.2d at 475; see
supra note 124 and accompanying text.
230. 85 N.J. at 261, 426 A.2d at 481.
231. See D. MAYERs, supra note 23, § 6:9 (Supp. 1988); Minogue, Anencephalic Newborns
as Organ Donors, 260 J. A.MA- 1239 (1988). In terminally ill and incompetent treatment
cases, the family, acting as guardian for the individual patient, is seen as the proper choice
for the decisionmaking role for the following reasons:
(1) The family is generally most concerned about the good of the patient.
(2) The family will also usually be most knowledgeable about the patient's
goals, preferences, and values.
(3) The family deserves recognition as an important social unit that ought to
be treated, within limits, as a responsible decision-maker in matters that inti-
mately affect its members.
(4) Especially in a society in which many other traditional forms of community
have eroded, participation in a family is often an important dimension of per-
sonal fulfillment.
(5) Since a protected sphere of privacy and autonomy is required for the flour-
ishing of this interpersonal union, institutions and the state should be reluc-
tant to intrude, particularly regarding matters that are personal and on which
there is a wide range of opinion in society.
Burger, Responsibility for Preserving Human Life, 7 CRM. JUST. J. 275, 302-03 (quoting
PRESDENrr'S COMMISSION, supra note 86, ch. 4, at 128).
232. 85 N.J. at 258-59, 426 A.2d at 480-81.
233. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
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rental autonomy, and the state must overcome a serious burden of
justification before it can abridge the parental autonomy presump-
tion.234 The court noted, however, that parental rights are not ab-
solute, that the state may interfere to protect the infant's well-be-
ing, and that "[o]ne of the most basic values protected by the state
is the sanctity of human life. '235 The court also stated: "Of course,
the underlying consideration [in ordering medical treatment of a
minor] is the child's welfare and whether his best interests will be
served by the medical treatment. 23 6 Through this qualification of
the parental autonomy presumption, the court acknowledged im-
plicitly the possibility of an inherent tension between the privacy
right of parental discretion and the best interests of the child. In
cases regarding medical treatment of incompetents, Phillip B. thus
takes a middle position between the poles of Barry, which empha-
sized the importance of parental privacy and discretion, and
Grady, which emphasized the role of the courts in preserving the
incompetent's right of privacy.
In an expansive interpretation of the right of privacy in In re
Quinlan,3 1 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the right of
privacy includes a patient's decision to decline treatment even if
this will lead to death. 3s In certain circumstances, the court found
a personal right to control one's own body may override the state's
general interest in preserving life. 39 In Quinlan, the court also
noted that the focal point of the decision was the patient's poor
prognosis and the lack of a reasonable probability of return to a
cognitive life. 4 ° Later, in In re Conroy,241 the same court qualified
this right of self-determination, however, saying it may yield in
some cases to a countervailing societal interest in preserving the
person's life. 42
234. Id. at 801-02, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51; see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
235. Id. at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
236. Id. at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
237. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
238. Id. at 39-40, 355 A.2d at 663.
239. Id. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 664.
240. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
241. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
242. Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223.
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The courts thus are not in agreement in determining the balance
between parental autonomy and the state power to protect incom-
petents.243 Most courts draw some line beyond which parental dis-
cretion may not reach, but often decline to intervene unless the
state interest is compelling. In reviewing or determining treatment
decisions of infants, courts have considered the following factors:
the infant's right to live or die, the parents' competing privacy in-
terests, the state's interest in upholding the value of life, the qual-
ity of life of the newborn should it survive, and the risks of treat-
ment to the infant in light of the prognosis.244
Unlike other handicapped infant situations, in anencephalic do-
nor cases the balancing of competing rights and interests does not
require consideration of the potential quality of life of the in-
fant,24 5 nor the projected financial costs of care on the parents,2 "
nor the long term emotional and psychological burden on family
life.24 7 The anencephalic newborn has no potential for meaningful
life and a very short life span.248 These facts significantly alter the
243. The court in Quinlan attempted to protect incompetents from the conflicting inter-
ests of parents and the state by requiring approval of Hospital Ethics Committees for deci-
sions to withdraw treatment. This requirement recognized implicitly the impermissibility of
one family and their physician making such important decisions alone. P. RIGA, supra note
125, at 156-57. Riga suggests that the promulgation of authoritative and specific criteria to
describe defective characteristics when treatment may be withheld would "'lessen the risks
of delegating treatment [decisions] to parents, physicians or committees'" and "'would re-
present a collective social judgment, rather than idiosyncratic choices of parents and com-
mittees, as to when social costs outweigh individual benefits."' Id. at 162, 166 (quoting Rob-
ertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV.
213, 266 (1975)).
244. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 396 (D.D.C.
1983); Note, supra note 216, at 226-29.
245. See In re Guardianship of Infant Doe, No. 1-782A157 (Ind. Cir. Ct., Apr. 14, 1982).
In this case, parents chose to withhold treatment, including food and corrective surgery,
from their Down's Syndrome child. The lower court held that the value of parental auton-
omy outweighed the infant's right to life when such right to life could not guarantee even a
minimally adequate quality of life. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
decision. Indiana seals documents of sensitive cases and therefore no public records of this
case are available. Burger, supra note 231, at 290 & n.75.
246. Costs of caring for a defective child can be staggering. In a 1976 case, six months of
treatment for a premature baby cost $104,403.20. Note, supra note 216, at 228 n.27 (citing
Stinson & Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, 7 J. MED. ETHICS 5, 10 (1981)).
247. "[A defective child's] presence may adversely affect the stability of the parents' mar-
riage and the emotional well-being of siblings." Id. at 228.
248. See supra notes 12-27, 83 and accompanying text.
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policy approach used to determine a standard of evaluation. Physi-
cians generally agree that they should not take extraordinary mea-
sures to preserve the life of an anencephalic newborn.249 Because of
the certainty of death in a short period of time, the balancing fac-
tors favor allowing the anencephalic newborn to die. The state's
interest in upholding the value of life, however, mitigates against
the affirmative act of taking organs, which harms the anencephalic
newborn by hastening death. Yet, the state may also protect the
countervailing value of preserving the donee's life.
The balancing process comes down ultimately to a rights conflict
between the anencephalic newborn's rights to bodily integrity and
to die naturally against the donee's right to life. The anencephalic
newborn's parents embody this rights conflict in that, while theo-
retically exercising the privacy right of their infant, they also exer-
cise the right to life of the donee by choosing to donate their new-
born's organs.
BALANCING OF INTERESTS
The issues involved in transplanting organs from anencephalic
newborns are best approached from a balancing of interests per-
spective to determine if the end of saving the donee's life justifies
the means of taking the anencephalic's life. Proponents of permit-
ting anencephalic newborns to serve as organ donors argue from a
utilitarian point of view that not to use viable organs when they
can serve the ultimate good of saving human life is unethical. They
focus on the beneficial consequences to the donee and view the is-
sue as a simple choice between either prolonging the donee's life or
249. See Note, supra note 216, at 251. In 1982, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop stated:
[M]edicine may never have all the solutions to all the problems that occur at
birth. I personally foresee no medical solution to ... an anencephalic child ....
In these cases the prognosis is an early and merciful death by natural causes.
There are no so-called "heroic measures" possible and intervention would
merely prolong the patient's process of dying .... For such infants, neither
medicine nor law can be of any help.
Id. at 251 n.195 (quoting Handicapped Infants: Oversight Hearing on the Treatment of
Handicapped Infants Born with Other Defects Before the Subcomm. on Select Education
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1982) (statement of
Dr. C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon General, Dept. of Health and Human Services)); see
Raphael, supra note 202, at 8 (stating that very few people, even Roman Catholics, would
advocate that doctors take special measures to preserve the lives of anencephalic newborns).
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permitting the certainty of his or her death. They argue that due
to the anencephalic newborn's lack of a brain and potential for
higher functions, and because of the certainty of diagnosis, the
brain death definition of death should not apply. The brain death
standard of complete cessation of brain activity, including the
brain stem, was designed to protect comatose patients who possess
a remote chance of recovering their higher functions.250 Proponents
of anencephalic donations argue that the voluntary nature of the
parents' donation, the psychological benefits parents receive by les-
sening their tragedy, and the benefits to society in the form of al-
truistic behavior and preserved resources justify such donations. 51
Proponents also note that the present policy prohibiting donation
of organs of anencephalic newborns until they are brain dead is
incompatible with, the medical practice of aborting anencephalic
fetuses right up until the moment of birth. 52 The law has drawn
an arbitrary line at live birth whereupon the anencephalic newborn
suddenly gains new rights. 53
Opponents to permitting anencephalic newborns to serve as do-
nors argue that using value of life considerations, which refer to
the worth or social utility of one person's life to others, such as
financial and emotional burdens on families or resources saved,
will lead to a dangerous slippery slope.2" They support the sanc-
tity of life principle that is based on a belief in the intrinsic worth
and equal value of every life255 and parallels the legal concept of
250. Arras & Shinnar, supra note 19, at 2285.
251. In a letter to the editor one parent of an anencephalic newborn would have liked to
have had the choice to donate her infant's organs.
In the utter depths of our despair we would have had at least the comfort
that our daughter's death was not meaningless if the result had been life for
other babies .... If there is any "moral dilemma" its resolution should lie with
those who must also bear the grief, not for "society" in general.
Meyer, supra note 9, at 90.
252. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
253. Id.
254. See Comment, Natural Death: An Alternative in New Jersey, 73 GEO. L.J. 1331,
1337 & n.61 (1985). "The major weakness of the quality of life argument ... is the question
of who determines ,.. to what degree must the 'quality' of life be impaired before we can
end it?... [This question involves] a value judgment [of] what life is all about." P. RIGA,
supra note 125, at 142.
255. Comment, supra note 254, at 1337 n.61.
Nor can the suffering of others, no matter how tragic or personal, be consid-
ered more weighty than the life of the unconscious, terminally ill patient or
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personhood . 56 They say that respect for the inherent dignity and
inviolability of a person is a moral good that outweighs the evil of
another's death due to natural causes.2 57 Opponents argue that any
other approach does not focus on the best interests of the
anencephalic newborn and could become a justification for taking
organs from comatose, mentally deficient or other handicapped in-
dividuals who become a burden to society. 58 In relative value of
life judgments, parents and society often receive the benefits of the
decision instead of the patient.259 To maintain the intrinsic worth
of each individual, opponents argue, physicians should base treat-
ment decisions on a balancing of the burdens of treatment against
the possible benefits solely from the patient's perspective. 6 0 Bal-
ancing from the patient's perspective ensures that the patient re-
ceives the benefit of the donation and prevents those making the
decision from acting in their own self-interest.
Opponents argue also that by taking organs from a non-brain-
dead infant, society is saying, in effect, that the donee's life has
more value than the infant's life being taken. Although the donee
arguably has more potential for a longer life and a higher "quality
of life," to accept this as a justification for taking a life, they claim,
defective newborn. The long and short of the matter is, quite simply, that if
one individual must sacrifice his life for the benefit of others-no matter how
noble the motive-however useful for the benefit of others, then we have ac-
knowledged the principle ... [that] rational utility can justify practically any
outcome.
P. RIGA, supra note 125, at 141. But see Walters, Anencephalic Infants: Means to an End
or Ends in Themselves? Transplant of Their Organs Can Save Lives, L.A. Times, Dec. 10,
1987, at 11, col. 3.
Ideals that support our sense of exalted human worth can have practical
limitations. For instance, statisticians ... constantly weigh the costs of saving
individual lives against various societal benefits. We have a variety of ends
other than the mere biological existence of all individuals .... High value of
individual life is vital-but when high-tech medicine sustains merely vegeta-
tive human life, the doctrine of infinite worth has surpassed its limits ....
Sentient, not comatose, human life is an end in itself.
Id.
256. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
257. Shewmon, supra note 8, at 1779. But see Letter to the Editor, Anencephalic Infant
Dilemma, L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1987, at 6, col. 4 ("There is nothing dignified or humane
about denying a transplant opportunity to an organ recipient.").
258. Steinfels, supra note 16.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69, 197-98, 216.
260. See Comment, supra note 254, at 1348-49.
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sets a dangerous precedent for the rights of all incapacitated or
comatose patients. Such a precedent creates a new brain death
standard in which loss of higher functions or consciousness be-
comes the equivalent of death, with presence of independent
heartbeat and respiration no longer indicative of "life." Any error
or uncertainty in diagnosis thus closes the door on such individu-
als. 61 Opponents claim that placing the medical profession in a po-
sition of active killing versus passive withdrawal of treatment is
contrary to the Hippocratic oath not to harm and will threaten the
integrity of the profession and its role as "healer." '262 Current pol-
icy protects the profession by keeping the issues of death and dy-
ing separate from the issue of transplantation and by requiring




Any proposal that permits the taking of anencephalic newborn
organs prior to brain death must address the concerns outlined
above. Current death statutes are inadequate. The best means to
achieve this is first to create statutorily a category for anencephaly
outside the ordinary continuum or stages of death. Brain death is
an arbitrary line the law draws along the process of death to define
legal death. Because the anencephalic newborn has no brain and
lacks potential capacity for higher functions, its situation is unique
and can be defined very narrowly as equivalent to brain dead. This
"brain absent" category 264 is the only means to avoid the slippery
slope outlined above.26 5
Second, in order for this categorical exception to succeed, a legis-
lative proposal must ensure the absolute certainty of diagnosis by
requiring at least two concurring physicians' opinions. Ordinarily,
the diagnosis is unambiguous and the few cases of misdiagnosis are
not significant enough to thwart uses of the exception.
261. See Post, History, Infanticide, and Imperiled Newborns, HASTINGS CENTER REP.
Aug./Sept. 1988, at 14, 17.
262. See Hirsh, supra note 35, at 394-96.
263. This proposal is loosely structured on the procedures for treatment termination deci-
sions outlined in In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
264. See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 73-80, 254-61 and accompanying text.
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A third essential requirement is that parental consent be fully
informed and purely voluntary, with no evidence of self-interest or
coercion. A panel of legal and health professionals can ensure this
by reviewing the circumstances of the case prior to the birth of the
infant. In order to recognize and respect parental autonomy, in-
cluding the power to exercise the child's privacy rights, this panel
should give considerable deference to the parents' and physicians'
mutual decision. Such a review panel must concur in the decision
after examining the diagnostic process and interviewing the par-
ents. Should disagreement exist among the panel members or
among family members, they should have recourse to court appli-
cation for judicial review. 6
Fourth, to maintain the integrity of the transplant process we
must ensure no conflict of interest exists in the physicians in-
volved; the physician performing the transplant surgery must be
one other than the physician determining the time of death, which
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968 currently requires for all
transplants, s6 and one other than the physician diagnosing the
anencephaly in the first place. Finally, the process must retain, to
the greatest extent possible, the dignity of the anencephalic new-
born by minimizing suffering and avoiding extraordinary medical
intervention that would be withheld ordinarily, such as the at-
tempted resuscitation of stillborn infants.'" Parents should make
the transplant decision before birth if possible or soon thereafter
so that life support, which only serves to prolong dying, can be
minimized.
A legislative framework enabling parents of anencephalic
newborns to donate their infant's organs before legal brain death is
possible. Safeguards built into the proposal limit the scope of ap-
plication and prevent any slippery slope dangers. In summary,
such a proposal must:
1) create a "brain absent" category specifically limited to
anencephaly that declares such infants equivalent to brain dead;
266. See Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreatment Decisions, 30
STAN. L. REv. 599, 629-32 (1978) (suggesting that judicial review of parental decisions to
withhold treatment be limited to considerations of infeasibility of treatment and integrity of
the decisionmaking process).
267. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT OF 1968 § 7(b), 8A U.L.A. 15, 59 (1983).
268. Meilaender, Comment, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1986, at 22, 23.
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2) demand accuracy of diagnosis by requiring confirmation by
two physicians;
3) require a fully informed and voluntary choice by the donor
parents;
4) require a review of the diagnosis and parental decision by a
panel of health and legal professionals;
5) provide opportunity for court intervention should disagree-
ments exist among panel or family members;
6) limit potential conflicts of interest by requiring the diagnostic
physicians be separate from the transplant surgeons;
7) require a donation decision be made and approved prior to
birth if possible;
8) preserve the dignity of the donor newborn by minimizing ex-
traordinary medical intervention that prolongs the dying process.
CONCLUSION
This legislative proposal cannot alter the ultimate fact that the
anencephalic newborn's death will be hastened for utilitarian pur-
poses. A donation process can be structured, however, in a humane
and strictly controlled way that minimizes slippery slope possibili-
ties and maintains respect for the dignity of the anencephalic new-
born. Clearly articulated policy goals and compassionate attitudes
by those implementing and participating in the process ultimately
define the character of such donations and can make such trans-
plants viable alternatives.
Kathleen L. Paliokas
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